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\MiY WAR?
BY T. SWANK HARDING.
REASON is the noblest faculty of man ; at its highest stage of
development it differentiates him most clearly from the brute.
But reason is also a recently acquired faculty and is far from evenly
distributed among men. It is present to the greatest extent in the
abnormally developed human mind but shades down through the
normal, the dull normal and the moron to the lower types of im-
becility and idiocy where it can scarcely be said to exist at all. Con-
sequently the mental line of demarcation between man and the lower
animals is indistinct and overlapping ; many hold that animals reason,
while it can scarcely be insisted that the idiot and the low-grade-
imbecile go througli the process.
Reason, being a recently acquired faculty, is all too readily
slipped off in moments of emotional tension, and, just as a for-
eigner reverts to his native language under stress of anger, so we all
tend to revert to impulse and instinct in the presence of emotionall\'
exciting ideas. It is only reason at its highest
—
siii compos, as James
tells us—that enables a man to view things tolerantly, rationally and
cosmically when his lower and more purely animal instincts are
aroused. Moreover, many men capable of true reasoning when alone
become victims of what is called "mob psychology" when in groups
and the flames of emotion kindle them wholesale ; they become
utterly deaf to the voice of moderation and woe unto him who shall
bravely stand forth to rebuke them in the day of their madness.
The fact that scientific tests have shown that at least one third of
our population will test below the moron grade on an approved
mental scale demonstrates the reason for this, at least in part. It
would seem that more of the higher-grade minds should be able to
withstand the assaults of the impulsive masses, but many factors
enter in here, and e\'en the man who thinks rationally in private
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finds it expedient in emero'encies to cater to the herd instinct in
public.
It is perfectly possil)le for waxes of irrational emotion to sweep
nations off their feet at peace. Such a wave struck France during
the celebrated Dreyfus affair when millions of peojjle ceased alto-
gether to reason and gave themselves up to emotion and impulse.
So prevalent is this tendency, even at normal times, that i)hilosophers
of the cast of Bertrand Russell question the fact that reasoning
exists in the sense usually postulated, but are rather inclined to
think that each individual is the battlefield of contlicting impulses
of which the strongest tinally wins and rules.
Certain it is that there is more emotion and habit in the world
than reason. The a\-erage man would rather do almost anything
under heaven than think ; it is so much easier to adopt the opinions
that are vouched for by those who want him to think as it is to their
purpose to ha\e him think. For there is alwa_\s a cunning group
ready and waiting to take advantage of man's weakness, to gorge
him with one side of a case and suppress the other, thus to whip
him into a fury for or against some pet idea. \\'hether the ultimate
desire is rational or not matters little ; whether the projected end
to be attained ever is attained matters less ; once arouse the emotion
and it will carry on automatically till discharged, whereupon the
individual feels a wholesome sense of righteous relief that repays
all effort with interest.
To-day we find ourseh'es for all practical purposes at the end
of a great war which was fought ostensibly for ideals by all nations
engaged therein. X'iewed in a large sense, one must inevitably con-
clude that the ideals espoused by one side were infinitely superior
to those espoused by the other. Whether we belie\e in cosmic
progress or no. in absolute values or no. we must admit that the
theoretical contentions of the Allied nations stood ujjon a higher
plane than did those of the Teutonic powers. We cannot think
otherwise without ignoring the lessons of history altogether.
In spite of this fact we find ourselves possessed of a peace that
is no peace in the sense that we meant to have it ; and that we have
been duped and disappointed just as war always dupes and dis-
appoints us. In spite of what the past told us we set out to uphold
idealism by force of arms and failed miserably, just as the reflective
man foresaw that we must inevitably fail at working such a miracle.
And now come the halting, stammering apologies of the liberals who
went wildly war-mad ; who forgot their reasoned doctrines of other
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days and, intoxicated with emotion, promised us everything if we
would but gird our loins and draw the sword for "democracy."
Had we kept our lofty ideals all would have been different
;
but just this it is utterly and forever impossible to do in the welter
of conflict. While armies meet opposing armies in battle array there
is waged continually the conflict between reason and emotion, and
in war. emotion invariably wins, however much restraint be preached
The ethics of civilized life cannot be reversed and good come there-
from
;
the morals of peace cannot be disregarded and conflict remain
on a high moral plane ; and, most important of all, war is not con-
structive and is powerless to bring about a reign of justice, truth
and brotherhood.
These melancholy facts are not due to man's intellectual in-
sincerity, to the machinations of capitalists or diplomats, or to any
one of a number of other things so much as to the fact tliat mass
psychology is so consummately mismanaged, the lower emotions
are so violently aroused and played upon by different agencies,
violence and slaughter are so unanimously lauded and all rational
considerations are so bitterly denounced and so ruthlessly sup-
pressed that no nation, while in a state of war, can act upon high
ideals.
This is not to say that war can always be avoided at the present
stage of world progress ; it is not necessarily to preach the doctrine
of non-resistance. The desire is to direct attention to the tremen-
dous fallacy—the greater illusion—that the noblest purposes and the
highest duties may somehow be miraculously accomplished by the
magic power of war ; the doctrine is really and simply that Might
can make Right, the doctrine that it was our misfortune gradually
to absorb from Prussia to our great disaster.
We do not need labored explanations to tell us why Mr. Wilson
failed at Paris ; certainly he did not fail on account of old-world
reaction. This may have been an immediate cause but it was not
the ultimate cause. America began the war in a novel and unusual
manner—she began it without any desire to gain material things,
without rancorous hatred and in a high spirit of altruism. We had
a matchless opportunity to deal militarism a death-blow by oblite-
rating its worst pest spot—Potsdam. Russia had disintegrated, and.
if ever, war had an opportunity to accomplish something of value.
Instead of this we soon became mad with emotion ; a vicious
propaganda was started to lend the white heat of fury and no story
was too absurd to be told solemnly in order to deprive us of more
reason and to give in its stead the most degraded instincts. We
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even welcomed a new democracy with sneers and went madly on and
on until man's noblest faculty was submerged in the conflict and
only a wild and incoherent melee of emotion and impulse remained.
In the effort to defeat autocracy in the field we ourselves adopted
more and more of the hateful institutions of autocracy; so much
so that, spiritually. Germany really won the war.
In the midst of this raging animalism the Germans suddenly
and unexpectedly collapsed and we reaped the whirlwind of our
blocked neuron paths : inhibited from annihilating the Teuton race
to the last babe, we discharged our emotions first in a mendacious
and predatory peace and ultimately in mad forays against our own
selves in lieu of foreign enemies to damage.
Yet there were and are occasional voices of reason raised in
this rude storm of passion. In the Atlantic Monthly of December,
1919.^ A. Clutton-Brock dared protest that we could put no nation
outside the pale: that we were really not gods after all. but men,
with the sins and shortcomings of men ; then he promulgated that
rank heresy that we should forgive even as we desire to be for-
given and. in the broader sense, actually love our enemies. While
these dubious doctrines from that most dangerous and radical of
books, the New Testament, may be looked upon with proper trepi-
dation, this trepidation would perhaps be less if we dared contem-
plate the war cosmically and in its true relationships.
When we turn to consider the prime question of %vhy men fight
one is led to wish that all people mentally capable of reasoning
might read at least three books ; it would seem that the perusal of
these three books would be the best preventive for wars of the
future—so trivial, so childish and so absurd are the common in-
centives to collective homicide. And yet the average man could
doubtless read these books without changing his opinion a whit, so
enslaved is he by habit and so impervious to cold logic by reason
of emotional bias. The three books to which we have reference
are Hozv Diplomats Make War by Francis Xeilson. What Is Na-
tional Honor? by Leo Perla and ]Vhy Men Fight by Bertrand
Russell.
Neilson's book does precisely what the title indicates and that
most effectively ; Russell's book carries out its title in similar man-
ner but necessarily on broader lines : Perla dissects and analyzes
national honor or prestige and makes very clear the childish in-
consistencies and errors into which our entire lack of any inter-
1 Arthur Clutton-Brock, "The Pursuit of Happiness," Atlantic Monthly.
December, 1919.
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national consciousness leads us. A more complete logical demon-
stration of the emotional and irrational character of national honor
would be hard to tind than this clear and concise work of Perla.
To this brief list might well be added Thorstein Veblen's tine
treatise on the Nature of Peace. In the first two chapters of this
book will be found a masterly expose of the imbecilities of what
goes under the name of patriotism, containing also the following
excellent paragraph
:
'Tt is, at least, a safe generalization that the patriotic sentiment
never has been known to rise to the consummate pitch of enthusias-
tic abandon except when bent on some work of concerted malevo-
lence. Patriotism is of a contentious complexion, and finds its full
expression in no other outlets than warlike enterprise ; its highest
and final appeal is for death, damage, discomfort and destruction
of the party of the second part. . .There is, indeed, nothing to hinder
a bad citizen from being a good patriot ; nor does it follow that a
good citizen—in other respects—may not be a very indififerent
patriot."
With an emotion of such character as this nurtured and encouraged
the transition to armed conflict is sooner or later inevitable. And
until this sectarian orthodoxy is replaced by a more universal phi-
losophy we shall have nationalistic wars just as we had religious
wars until sectarianism—without l)eing annihilated by any means
•
—
gained a catholic view-point and the tolerance that goes therewith.
Some years ago James Hopper told in an article in Collier's
how wars come about. Tt was at the time we had gone into Mexico
after X'illa ; hereuj)on the Mexicans decided that we wanted not so
much to take Villa as to take Mexico, and Carranza said "Get out
!"
We replied that we would get out when Carranza properly policed
the border. Carranza dispatched troops for this purpose. There-
upon we .shook our heads and wisely said, 'A\'hy are these troops
in Chihuahua? D—n funny business. Going to attack us, eh?"
And Hopper commented—"Such is human nature—and thus wars
come." -And it is alas true. About just such microscopically trivial
things do men fight.
Men fight because they will be realists ; because they postulate
nations as personalities and not as aggregations of individuals like
unto themselves. They will revert to the universalism of old Al-
bertus Magnus and look askance at nominalism. "WHiat is honor?
.\ word. What is that word honor :^ Air—a trim reckoning." Hear
that incorrigible nominalist Falstaft" ; but do we usually agree with
him^ Or with stoic P>rutus who in deep despair cried ".Mas! I
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have found thee. X'irtue. but an empty name.'" \ irtue had been to
him a reality and he had seen it so in the same positi\e fashion as
he had seen liis own wife.
Tt is the unconscious reahsm of humanit}- that makes up the
glory and the heroism of life, and that makes war possil)le. "Men
die, not for a statement of fact, but for the Truth : not for a name,
but for an ideal reality I not for a territory with its inhabitants, but
for a country ; not for a piece of colored cloth on a staff, but for
a flag!" A\'hat is honor? Air? Indeed! Men fight because of their
profound, quite scholastic, realism.
Here might be quoted with profit satirical Dean Swift's delicious
remarks entitled -^ Digression on tlic Xatiirc, Usefulness and Neces-
sity of JJ'ars and Quarrels. Therein may be found the following
pithy sayings which help still further to show whv men fight. "War
is an attempt to take l)y violence from others a ])art of what thev
have and we want. . . .h'very man fully sensible of his own merit,
and finding it not dul_\- regarded by others, has a natm-al right to
take from them all that he thinks due to himself. . . .Wise princes
find it necessary to have wars abroad, to keep peace at home. . . .
Most professions would be useless if all were peaceable." To read
this is to laugh, and \et we .should be careful ho^v we laugh ; for
when we come right doun to brass tacks it is iust such silly and
absurd things as these that start wars.
Arthur Ponsonby- declared that "the inevitable clamor which
arises on the outbreak of war is construed as popular approval."
He explains that the people are kept in ignorance of foreign aft'airs
and of diplomacy generally, but that things are so explained to them
and news is so colored at the outbreak of war that the part of
diplomacy in bringing it about is obscured. He remarks that the
London Times of Xovember 23, 1912, admitted that diplomats
alone caused war. Imagine what would have happened had the
Times dared print such an opinion in 191.^! In 1912 it was safe to
reason about such matters; in 1915 it was unsafe to do anything
other than to cater to the wild emotions of the blood-intoxicated
populace.
Roland Hugins'' repeats the old story of how England was in
1906 secretly committed to act in concert with France in anv case
of war with Germany, though Lord Grey repeatedlv denied such a
fact when interrogated in the Commons. He declared further thai
the London Times of March 12. 1915. said "Herr von Rethmann-
- Arthur Ponsonby. Doiiocracy aud Diplomacy.
•'Roland Htigins. Grnihiiiy Ml'^iudiird. ' : .'
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Hollweg is quite right. Even had Germany not invaded Belgium,
honor and interest would have united us with France." It seems
more than probable that England was diplomatically botmd to her
allies more stringently than her people or her parliament for a
moment suspected ; that a small coterie of diplomats can so bind
over an entire nation is absolutely wrong, regardless of the merits
and demerits in this particular instance.
It is also to be remembered that the Crimean War is said to
have been partly brought about by Lord Stratford de RedclyiTe
who boasted to Lord Bath that he would get back at the Czar for
a personal grudge by fomenting a war! How easily the man in
power can foment a war is demonstrated by Bismarck's faked
telegram which placed the foolish and bellicose Xapoleon III in such
a position that he could not avoid a conflict. However, there were
two sides to this war. as to any other ; the emperor is known to
have shouldered the entire blame for the conflict of 1870 in a letter
to a friend. W. Morton Fullerton. a good apostle of militarism.^
absolves France for 1870 on the theory that Xapoleon III did not
truly represent her ; this appears to be dangerous doctrine because
it would absolve the Germany of 1914 on the theory that the Kaiser
did not represent his people—though emotionalists have proven both
that William II was and was not a power in his empire—in either
case entirely to their own satisfaction. The words written by
Napoleon III to the Comtesse de Mercy-Argenteau just after Frank-
fort nevertheless remain: they are
—
'T admit, we were the aggres-
sors." We are willing to admit that this paragraph proves neither
side of the case ; what it does prove is the utter triviality of the
causes which often lead to wholesale murder.
In the case of the Boer War we have a conflict which is now
viewed apologetically and with shame by the more clear-thinking
and equitable inhabitants of the victorious nation. In The War in
South Afriea J, A. Hobson very clearly analyzes this predatory
struggle, showing first how lies, carefully used, can cause a war.
and then how they were used in this instance. He declares that
his nation scorned arbitration and that a letter from President
Steyn of the Orange Free State was mutilated for public consump-
tion in a way strikingly Bismarckian. for Sir A. Alilner omitted
from its contents anything that would have tended toward peaceful
sentiment and madi it appear exaggeratedly bellicose. The chapter
entitled "A Chartered Press" is a classic expose of the diabolical
activities of this institution when set to war-making. In another
* W. Morton Fullerton, Problems of Pmvcy.
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volume' Hobson explains how imperialism and colonialism connived
together to cause this unfortunate war and to put the Roer States
under the British flag.
Sydney Low is quoted" as saying that Cecil Rhodes admitted
all British grievances could have been solved without war, but that
he wanted the territory from the Cape to the Zambesi, a suzerainty
to which the Boer States could not agree. While the Boers were,
during the war. described as most inferior people, immediately after
the war was won they were praised extravagantly as virile additions
to the empire by their former defamers—Grey, Froude, Geo. Colley.
Hercules Robinson, Bishop Colenso. Kitchener and the London
Standard. The amount of reasoning in such procedure could scarcely
be detected microscopically. Furthermore. England hastened to
adopt the same harsh attitude toward the native for which she
avowedly went into the war to chastise the Boers, and the Boers
themselves were permitted to mistreat British Indian subjects as
much as they liked. So much for the ultimate moral value of war
:
for once the aroused emotion has its psychological discharge there
is utter indiiTerence to the ideals which were used as a cloak of
self-righteousness to camouflage simple aggrandizement.
Alfred Hoyt Granger' says England now admits that the famous
Kruger telegram was not written by the Kaiser and that while France
and Holland rapturously received Kruger on his European visit, he
was spurned by William It. Hobson furthermore declares that
Rhodes "used the legislature of Cape Colony to support and
strengthen the diamond monopoly of the De Beers, while from
De Beers he financed the Raid, debauched the constituencies of
Cape Colony, and bought the public press in order to engineer the
war, which was to win him full possession of his great 'thought.'
the North." It is plain that men fought in this instance for very
uncertain ideals at least, if not purely for material gain and the
love of fight.
We American have had our own unnecessary wars, there being
the Mexican debauch, which General Grant himself condemned as
unnecessary, and the Spanish war. In the latter instance Spain
was apparently willing to grant our every contention'' and McKinlev
was quite as anxious to avoid war as Spain, but propaganda had
succeeded so admirably in inflaming the ill-controlled emotions of
•^
J. A. Hobson. Diplomacy After the War.
" E. D. Morel, Germany and Morocco.
^ Alfred Hoj-t Granger, England's li'orld Empire.
^ David Starr Jordan. War and Waste.
528 THK f)PEN COURT.
the masses that armed conflicl was iiicvital)le. Individuals sadlv
lack "the power to suspend l)ehef in the i)resence of an emotionally
excitiuf^ idea" ; wliat can we expect of emotions en masse where
intellect is necessaril}' at the low, average level?" W^illiani (iraham
Sumner^" uses this war to demonstrate the fallacies of militaristic
philosoph}' : he also calls attention to the fact that we blandly forced
our "ci\'ilization" on the Phillipines although we fought Spain for
forcing hers upon them, and that tlic ideas of the nations for the
betterment of the "uncivilized" are mutually antagonistic.
Da\'id Starr Jorrlan^' holds that the Italo-Turk War was largely
fomented by the Hank of Rome, that it was tolerated both by
Britain and Germany because each of them hoped to win Italy to
their Alliance: and that the real \-ictors were the French bankers
who finally stepped in and, with a wave of the hand, stopped the war
to pre^ent Turkey from l)eing too ])adh' beaten ! Prof. Francis
Delaisi of Paris admitted that France was \'itally interested in the
Balkan War and this "\ ital interest" was, of course, pecuniary
:
French money helped both sides in the contest. Xor was this
"France" considered abstractly and in a sense in which no country
exists ; it was individual French investors who thus cheerfully pro-
longed war when it was at a distance : and these were the same
French who wailed so miserably when exposed to it at close range.
It is well known that while internationalistic labor is looked
upon as most wicked, the internationalism of armament trusts was
accepted quite amiably. In l')13 Turkey, an ally of (lermany. con-
tracted with the h'nglish firtu of Armstrong-X'ickers to reorganize
her naval yards. Krupj^ and .Schneider-Creusot were partners in
developing the Algerian iron fields while the British arms trust had
branches in Italy, which cotmtry stood in enemy alliance. Further-
more, the celebrated Mulliuer scare, formulated by a mimition's man
to the effect that (Germany was secretly constructing battleships,
helped the armament men increase their dividends and made war
more' inevitable in 1^'14. '
''
Again, it is almost imi)()ssible for us to realize that it was an
actual fact that hjigland's phrase "Mistress of the Seas" appeared
(|uite as menacing to (iermauy as did ( Icrmany's "])lace in the sun
doctrine to England. Never will we see ourselves as others sec us.
Even our Monroe Doctrine, denud:d of the extenuating association-^
with wliicli wc habitually surround it in our own minds. a])i)cared
" William James, Psychohf/y.
10 William Graham Sumner. li'nr.
" Op. rit., p. S.
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formidable and perplexins^ to luiro{)e generally.'- As W. L. (iraiic
said/'' however much hjigland felt that her fleet was for purely
defensixe purposes (and she largely did feel so), Ciermany could
not, in the xerv nature of things. \iew it otherwise than as a menace.
And W. Morton FuUerton'* quotes Mr. Cioshen as declaring in 18^8
that this navv must be increased against Russia and might even be
needed against the I'nited States. Certainly men imbued with big
navy ideas fight about tri\ialities quite as readily as do men of big
army ideas ; and while it is not intended to minimize (ierman militar-
ism in the least, it is apparent that we iia\e studiously ignored our
own side of the case while giving tiie other side pitiless publicity.
A commercially unimportant piece of territory like Morocco,
which would be more valuable to all nations concerned if it were
internationalized, has been made a test of prestige between two proud
countries presumably inhabited by adults and not by boasting boys
in their early teens. Should any one care to investigate the de])lor-
able morals of the powers generally in regard to this celebrated
ailair, their infinitely petty bickerings with one another, their endless
machinations and trickeries, their wholesale lies to the world and
their underhanded dealings in secret, their disregard for treaties and
for their solemn word of honor, their flagrant neglect of all that is
good, and just and true and rational and honorable—let him peruse
Germany and Morocco by I*'.. D. Morel. A more terrible expose of
tlie shamelessness of governments coidd scarcely be written.
Then too. purely faked causes can bring about war. At Alge-
ciras France pledged herself faithfully to respect the independence
of Morocco. Subsequently the Sultan was deliberately encouraged
in extravagance and France rej^eatedly expanded her police zone,
always backed up by England. In spite of the fact that France
needed money at home she made a loan of $10,000,000 to the Sultan
with a "rake-off" to her bankers of $2,500,000. Clashes with the
natives were repeatedly provoked—one in particular by deliberate
French violation of a native cemetery—and each clash resulted in
further French seizures. More money was continually forced on the
.Sultan : enormous bills were presented to him for damage inflicted
upon French troops (sic) : French writers faked stories of the
dangers Europeans underwent in Fez. and finally, when public
opinion was sufficiently inflamed. Fez was seized—and Ciermany
protested F"rench aggression in \iolation of her agreement. Such
1- Cf. Max Eastman. Understanding Gc'-inany.
'•'' W. L. Grane, The Passing of War.
1* Op. rit.. p. 4.
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was French morality when desirous of more territory. Of the
morahty of protesting Germany we have sn1)sequently had nausea-
ting evidence.'"
We must remember here and ahvays that "I'rance/' "Germany,"
etc.. are purely a1)stract terms fref|uently representing nothing more
than the pri\ate opinions, grudges and ambitions of a small grou])
of men who have managed to collect i)ower into their own hands
;
a plebiscite on any question—with all the facts known—might result
\ery differently. The Social Democrats, for instance, might really
have represented Ciermany since they were her most numerous party.
There are always antagonistic elements within a state and there
is.no nationalistic lionndary-line to the ills of the downtrodden.
When a few unscrnptdous men are no longer able to throttle a
country, to diff'use and to repress facts as they see fit and to play
upon mass psychologv in order to attain whatever end—good or
bad—they may have in mind: more certainly when men begin to
reason and cease to be herded like impulsive animals, an inter-
national consciousness of race solidarit}- will take the place of [)etty
fratricidal bickerings and human life will become vastly more
pleasant, and obviously more rational.
The unthinking masses are qtu"te bad enough without giving
them any particular incentive to slaughter. It may be remembered
that American sentiment, aroused by unscrupulous public men, once
demanded war with England over absolutely nothing. In 1896
Cullom was denoinicing Britain roundly : Dickinson was calling her
a sinister intriguer ; Lodge was declaring we must strike her ; Jos.
Ilawlev saw her as our natural enemy; Rear-Admiral iJelknap
insisted that her growing navy nnist be crushed ; bjhn P.. Wil-
son lauded war as a good thing and would have seen the Stars
and Stripes over the whole of \orth America : Ambrose Bierce
advised that we pray for war with England, and the dear, old blind
Chaplain of the House furnished the required prayers while the
press howled in rage. I'residcnt ( "icveland; stepped into the mass
brainstorm with a totally unnercssary and extremeU bigoted near .
ultimatum, and those who counseled moderation were, as is usual,
denounced as traitors and pro-enemy.
Fortunatelv. there were sane and intelligent men guiding the
destinies of England at the time, and a silly and disastrous war
was averted in spite of (jur contentiousness. In a short while Spain
felt the glowing ardor ()f our ])atriotism, this time deflected toward
Cuba, for ulterior motives certainly, becau.se the infinitely worse
'K'f. Tobn Haynes ]-[olniPS. .Vrxc IVors for Old.
suftcrin<;s of other Auicrican republics under cruel dictators had
failed to move us. This titiie public men. the jiress and the pulpit
prexailed in hrinijini,'- about a war which was. in the usual fashion,
demonstrated to be necessary, ri,i]jhteous and forced upon us. ^'et.
be it noted, we found similar bellicose struttin<(s most abominable
and most tremendoush' menacini^ in pre-war ( iermany !
Vor (iermany was \astly misunderstood by outsiders, just as
any nation is so misunderstood."' Dr. l.abberton has called them
a contem])lati\ e nation of poets and thinkers whose dexotion to the
inner life rendered them easily misjudq-ed and certaiidy peculiar.
Perhaps this explanation is as ^-ood as any other. The central jioiut
is that no nation sees facts rclatinc^ to itself other than in a halo of
meaninfjful associations and interpretixe limitations which are im-
known to any other peoj)le. To us ".Xmerica for .\mericans" is
wholesome and rea'^onable : to the la])anese "Asia for Asiatics" is^
the same; \et each nation linds the phrase of the other at least
perplexiuj^ if not positively irritatins^. Pile these misunderstandiufj?
tojj^ether. add thereto armaments in e()ual (|uantitv. <,'arnish with
diplomatic subterfuge and underhanded dealings, season with the
most acrid emotions and you invariably produce war.
Tn the case of the (ireat War we at first adopted a holier-than-
thou attitude and deplored the insanity of luu'ope ; {)ublic men.
pulpit and press agreed here. With the exents culminating in the
Pusitania" a wave of emotion swe])t i)ul})it. press and public, and
war seemed incxitable : but .Mr. Wilson—then against j)rej)aredness
—did not wish our country an armed camj). and ^Nlr. Daniels "re-
fused to lose his head because some ])eople were nervous"— in short,
the government, for some reason, saw lit to a\ert war. Mass emo-
tion at its very height was held in leash, demonstrating again how
easily war can be i)revented if an intelligent and reasoning goxern-
ment desires to prevent it.
I'ltimateh' a change came about; |)recisel\- win- it is too earlv
to predicate, nor are the facts ;i\ailable. l'"\ eutualK' the Senate
fleclared for war in almost the same terms that had ornamented
Reichstag debate for years, and I\oose\elt matched Treitschke in
truculence. At the time when a friendly gift of a billion or of fi\e
billions to the suiTerers from the war would haxe done more tn
demonstrate that one nation at least stood for the highest things,
the \acillate ministry was forsaking a peace-loving Christ as too
"^ Cf. J. H. Lalibcrton. Ih'l(/iuiii ami ( rniuiiiy ; alsci op. cit.. p. 12 and
Sigmund Freud's very rational little volume Kcflccfions on liar and Death.
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idealistic and demanding blood and destruction.'' In short. Ave
finally forsook the hard and bitter path of idealism and nobility
and took what seemed to appear the easy way to a New World
—
that which led by paths of glory through fields of gore.
And. "since the ethical values involved in any given inter-
national contest are substantially of the nature of after-thought or
accessory, they may safely be left on one side in any endeavor to
understand or to account for any given outbreak of hostilities. The
moral indignation of both parties to the ([uarrel is to be taken for
granted, as being the statesman's chief and necessary ways and
means of bringing any warlike enterprise to a head and floating
it to a creditable finish. It is a precipitate of the partisan animosity
that inspires both parties and holds them to their duty of self-sacri-
fice and devastation, and at its best it will chiefly serve as a cloak
of self-righteousness to extenuate any exceptionally profligate ex-
cursions in the conduct of hostilities."'"
We went in ourselves. We should not be criticized for the
}>lunge if half the things we claimed that we could thus attain
could have been thus attained. The incidence of regret falls upon
the fact that we were not sufficiently reflective and reasoning ani-
mals to then postulate how miserable our failure would be. That
it was a failure the results demonstrate, nnd any good that came
after the war and after the efforts of the inept Supreme Council
of Paris, came in spite of these agencies and in no sense because
of them.
'^ P'red. Lynch, Thr ChaUcvgr.
'" Thorstein Vchlen, The Nature of Peace.
